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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, J 
Plaintiff ^ Respondent, J 
\ Case No. 
/ 13835 
CHARLES ALBERT WINNING, I 
Defendant-Appellant. I 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF T H E NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Charles Winning, appeals from the 
Judgement and sentence imposed following his entry 
of a guilty plea in the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Jay Banks 
presiding. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
On August 30, 1974, the appellant, Charles Win-
ning, pled guilty in Third District Court to a Class A 
misdemeanor. The Defendant then waived his time 
for sentencing and requested that sentence be imposed 
immediately. The court sentenced the defendant to 
one year, gave him his choice as to whether to serve it 
in the Salt Lake County Jail or the Utah State 
Prison and denied him credit for some ten weeks he 
had spent in the Salt Lake County Jail prior to entry 
of his plea and sentencing. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order from this court vacating 
the sentence imposed on the defendant and ordering 
him resentenced and given credit for the time he served 
in Salt Lake County Jail prior to entry of his plea 
and sentencing. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
On June 11, 1974, the defendant was booked into 
Salt Lake County Jail on a charge of auto theft. The 
defendant was arraigned in city court on June 17, 
1974, (T. 2) and his preliminary hearing was set for 
July 19, 1974, (T. 2). On June 17, 1974, the Salt 
Lake City Court found the defendant indigent and 
appointed the Legal Defenders to represent him (T. 2) . 
After one continuance requested by the state, (T. 2) 
2 
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the defendant's preliminary hearing was held on July 
29, 1974, (T. 2) and the defendant was bound over 
(T. 2) . The defendant was arraigned in Third District 
Court on August 2, 1974, (T. 14) and entered his 
plea of not guilty, (T. 14). Trial was set for August 
30, 1974, (T. 14). On August 30, 1974, the date set 
for defendant's trial, he pled guilty to a lessor in-
cluded Class A misdemeanor (T. 15), (T. 29). The 
defendant waived time for sentencing and asked that 
sentence be imposed immediately (T. 15), (T. 29). 
The defendant represented to the court that he had a 
long criminal record (T. 28). The court sentenced the 
defendant to one year and gave him his choice as to 
whether to serve that sentence in the Salt Lake County 
Jail or the Utah State Prison (T. 29). The defendant 
requested the court to give him credit for approximately 
ten weeks he had spent in the Salt Lake County Jail 
prior to his sentencing (T. 30). The court refused 
(T. 30). The defendant, by and through his attorney, 
objected on the record to the court's refusal to give 
credit for the time served (T. 30), stating that such 
refusal was in violation of equal protection guaran-
tees (T. 30). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
F A I L U R E TO G I V E T H E D E F E N D A N T 
C R E D I T F O R T I M E H E S P E N T I N T H E 
S A L T L A K E COUNTY J A I L P R I O R TO H I S 
3 
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S E N T E N C I N G I S I L L E G A L U N D E R T H E 
E Q U A L P R O T E C T I O N C L A U S E O F T H E 
14TH A M E N D M E N T O F T H E U N I T E D 
S T A T E S CONSTITUTION. 
The State of Ohio had a statutory scheme allow-
ing their state courts to do what our court did in the 
case at bar without benefit of statute. In White vs. 
Gilligan, 351 F . Supp. 1012 (USDC, S. D. Ohio, E . D . 
1972), the Ohio District Court held the statute uncon-
stitutional stating, 
I n effect the Ohio statutory scheme established 
two classes of defendants. The first class con-
sists of those defendants who remain free prior 
to their convictions and who thus receive full 
credit for all their periods of actual confinement 
on the sentences ultimately imposed. The sec-
ond class consists of those defendants who 
remain in jail prior to their convictions and who 
therefore do not receive full credit for all their 
periods of confinement because under the Ohio 
statutory scheme pre-conviction confinement is 
not imprisonment . . . The court cannot find any 
legitimate state interest which is served by allow-
ing the state to grant full credit to one class 
of defendants while denying full credit to an-
other class of defendants. 
. . . where, for whatever reason, a defendant re-
mains in jail prior to his trial he must be given 
credit on the statutorily fixed sentence ulti-
mately imposed for all periods of actual con-
finement. (Emphasis added.) 
I n North Carolina vs. Pierce, 395 U. S. 711 
(1969), the Supreme Court held that a defendant who 
4 
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appealed his conviction and won was entitled to have 
any time served on the vacated conviction credited 
against any sentence received for a new conviction for 
the same offense. 
In State vs. Jaramillo, 25 Utah 328 (1971), in 
agreement with North Carolina vs. Pierce, Supra our 
Supreme Court said 
. . . fairness and justice require that where one 
has already served a part of the sentence for an 
offense, if something has proved amiss so that 
the conviction must be set aside, and there are 
further proceedings pursuant to which he is 
again sentenced for the identical offense, he 
should have credit for whatever portion of the 
sentence he has already served. 
An accused person can seldom conduct his life 
affairs freely during the period from arrest to trial. 
Obtaining employment is very difficult on a temporary 
basis and next to impossible on a permanent basis; mar-
riage, entry into contract, permanent relocation, school-
ing or other long range planning is severely hampered. 
The result is that this period is dead time in the life 
of a person accused of a felony. Accordingly, the 
accused should have the freedom of choice in obtaining 
or failing to obtain bail and even if he is financially 
able to obtain bail he should be free to choose incarcera-
tion and to know the time prior to trial will be credited 
against any statutory sentence which may later be 
imposed. Certainly the defendant's confinement in the 
Salt Lake County Jail prior to his entry of plea was 
punishment and since such punishment arose from the 
5 
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crime for which he was subsequently sentenced, fair-
ness and justice require that credit be given for this 
presentence confinement; equal protection demands 
no less. 
P O I N T I I 
TO A L L O W T H E S T A T E TO F A I L TO 
G I V E C R E D I T F O R T I M E S E R V E D P R I O R 
TO S E N T E N C I N G T E N D S TO COERCE D E -
F E N D A N T S I N T O W A I V I N G P R E L I M I -
N A R Y H E A R I N G S A N D P L E A D I N G 
G U I L T Y R A T H E R T H A N G O I N G TO T R I A L . 
TO A L L O W T H E S T A T E TO T H U S C H I L L 
T H E E X E R C I S E O F T H E BASIC CONSTI-
T U T I O N A L R I G H T O F T R I A L I S UNCON-
S T I T U T I O N A L . 
In Robinson vs. Beto, 426 F . 2d 797, (5th Cir. 
1970), the court found that the Texas statute (allow-
ing the courts at their discretion not to allow credit for 
time in jail awaiting direct appeal) tended to inhibit 
appellate review, discouraging defendants from appeal-
ing for fear they would not receive credit for time 
spent in jail pending appeal. In Hart vs. Henderson, 
449 F . 2d 183, (5th Cir. 1971), the court, referring 
to Robinson vs. Beta, supra stated. 
Such would also be the case where a defendant, 
by exercising his right to a trial by jury, 
confronts the risk of losing credit for the time 
spent in jail awaiting trial and further finds 
6 
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that for exercising this right, his pre-trial incar-
ceration is extended. Clearly, the defendant 
would have been penalized for exercising his 
constitutional rights. Such impediments serve to 
discourage the exercise of one of the most basic 
constitutional rights, a practice we find m-
permissible. Id. 186. 
In Pruett vs. State of Texas, 468 F . 2d 52 
(U.S.C.A., 5th Cir. 1972), the court extended the rul-
ing of Beto to include even good time credit, for the 
time spent in jail awaiting appeal, stating that to do 
otherwise would ". . . put a premium on not appealing 
sentences of conviction and constitutes a threat to a con-
victed person that if he appeals he will lose good time 
he might otherwise have . . . The right to appeal . . . is 
a sacred right that must remain free, open, and unfet-
tered and without fear, threats or penalty . . . " 
In United States vs. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, (1968) 
the Court said: 
. . . [PJenalzing those who choose to exercise 
constitutional rights 'would be patently uncon-
stitutional' and would 'chill the exercise of basic 
constitutional rights.' Id. at 582 (88 S. Ct. at 
1216). 
The right to trial by jury is no less a federal Con-
stitutional right than the right to appeal. The denial 
of credit for time spent in jail prior to trial should be 
no less "chilling" of the exercise of right to trial by 
jury than it has been ruled in the case of the right to 
appeal. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I I I 
F A I L U R E TO G I V E C R E D I T FOR T H E 
T I M E S P E N T I N T H E S A L T L A K E COUNTY 
J A I L V I O L A T E S T H E F I F T H A M E N D -
MENT G U A R A N T E E A G A I N S T D O U B L E 
J E O P A R D Y . 
The Supreme Court held in Benten vs. Maryland, 
395 U.S. 784 (1968) that the Fifth Amendment guar-
antee against double jeopardy is enforceable against 
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
constitutional protection provided includes protection 
against multiple punishments for the same crime. In 
North Carolina vs. Pearce, supra the Supreme Court 
held that upon a new conviction after a new trial, the 
punishment already exacted must be credited in im-
posing sentence, saying: 
If, upon a new trial, the defendant is ac-
quitted, there is no way the years he has spent 
in prison can be returned to him. But if he is 
reconvicted, those years can and must be returned 
—by subtracting them from whatever new sen-
tence is imposed. Id. 719. 
Ry direct analogy, the time the defendant in this 
case has spent in the Salt Lake County Jail prior to 
plea was punishment for the crime of which he was 
accused, and for which he was incarcerated prior to 
plea and for which he was later sentenced. Failure to 
credit this time is double punishment and, therefore, a 
violation of the guarantee against double jeopardy. I n 
Culp vs. Bounds, 325 F . Supp. 416 (W.D.N.C, 1971), 
8 
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the court ruled that failure to give credit for time spent 
in jail violated the federal Constitution in two ways, 
first because it constituted multiple punishment for a 
single offense, and secodly because it was an invidious 
discrimination of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In Ham vs. State of North 
Carolina, 471 F . 2d 406 (4th Cir. 1973), the court 
extended the ruling in Culp vs. Bounds supra to in-
clude cases where less than the maximum sentence 
was imposed. Subsequently, this rule was followed 
in three memorandum decisions of the Fourth Circuit. 
These decisions were then followed in Mohr vs. Jordan, 
370 F . Supp. 1149 (D.C. Maryland, 1974). This case 
involved five indigents not given credit for pretrial 
jail time against less than maximum sentences in 
Maryland. (Maryland courts had previously confirmed 
that in the case of maximum sentences, pretrial incar-
ceration time must be credited.) 
P O I N T I V 
F A I L U R E TO G I V E T H E I N D I G E N T D E -
F E N D A N T C R E D I T F O R T I M E S P E N T I N 
T H E S A L T L A K E COUNTY J A I L P R I O R TO 
H I S S E N T E N C I N G I S A V I O L A T I O N O F 
T H E E Q U A L P R O T E C T I O N C L A U S E O F 
T H E U N I T E D STATES CONSTITUTION. 
The Supreme Court held in Williams vs. Illinois, 
399 U.S. 235 (1970), that an indigent could not be 
confined beyond the maximum sentence imposed by 
9 
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statute because of his inability to pay the monetary 
portion of his sentence,, because such confinement vio-
lated the indigent defendant's rights under the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment: 
By making the maximum confinement con-
tingent upon one's ability to pay, the State has 
visited different consequenced on two categories 
of persons since the result is to make incarcera-
tion in excess of the statutory maximum ap-
plicable only to those without the requisite re-
sources to satisfy the money portion of the 
judgment. 399 U.S. at 242. 
I n Workman vs. Cardell, 338 F . Supp. 893, (N.D. 
Ohio, 1972), the court concluded that the failure to 
give credit for time spent in confinement prior to com-
mitment violated the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, because " . . . it compels an 
indigent prisoner to be confined for a period longer 
than one who is released on bail between verdict or plea 
and commitment." Id. 901. 
In U.S. vs. Gaines, 449 F . 2d 143 (2nd Cir., 1971), 
an indigent defendant was detained in jail on state 
charges while on probation awaiting sentencing on the 
federal conviction. The court held he was entitled to 
credit against the federal sentence for the jail time 
served after bail had been set because his "lack of wealth 
has resulted in his having to serve a sentence that 
a richer man would not have had to serve, an impermiss-
ible discrimination," Id. 144. I n Culp vs. Bounds (su-
pra) it was held that where a defendant is sentenced to 
10 
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maximum terms, and the offense is bailable, a state's 
refusal to give credit to the indigent's pre-sentence jail 
time to his sentence was an unconstitutional discrimi-
nation based on wealth because "wealthy defendants 
. . . are able to remain out of [jail] until conviction 
and sentencing; the poor stay behind bars." Id. 419. 
In Hart vs. Henderson, (supra), a defendant had been 
held in jail pending a direct appeal after a conviction 
and received no credit for this time against his sentence. 
The court, noting Peace and Williams, held "that the 
inability of an indigent criminal defendant to make 
bond should not result in extending the duration of his 
imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum" (page 
185), and remanded the case for consideration of the 
relevant facts. 
In In reYoung, 32 Cal.App.3d 68, the court up-
held the petition of an indigent defendant unable to 
make bail, against statutory denial of credit for 62 days 
spent in jail between his arrest and delivery to the De-
partment of Corrections. The court held his indigency 
operated to create an unconstitutional discrimination 
in favor of persons who are convicted of the same crime 
and who are able to afford bail and additional 
deprivation against the indigent who suffers. 
The defendant in the case at bar appeared before 
the Salt Lake City Court on June 17, 1974, was found 
to be indigent and referred to the Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders (T. 2). 
11 
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CONCLUSION 
Where a defendant has remained in jail after 
arrest and prior to sentencing, either by his free choice 
or due to his financial inability to make bond, and a 
court has sentenced him to the maximum provided for 
his offense and failed to grant his request to give him 
credit for the time he had already spent in jail, then 
he has been denied equal protection of the law as guar-
anteed him by the United States Constitution and his 
sentence must be modified to give him credit for time 
served prior to sentencing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J A C K W. K U N K L E R 
Attorney for Appellant 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
